UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-6-2014

Nelson v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41525

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Nelson v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41525" (2014). Not Reported. 1668.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1668

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WESTON KENNETH NELSON, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)

v.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

NO. 41525
BINGHAM CNTY NO. CV 2013-1542

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Respondent.
)
___________
)
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BINGHAM

HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho

I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720a0010

(208) 334-4534

I.S.B. #6247
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6661
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703

(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

PAGE
OF AUTHORITI

.................................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF THE CAS
Nature of the

............................................................................... 1

..................................................................................... 1

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 5
The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion
Summary
Dismissal Of Mr. Nelson's Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective,
And His Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered
Into, Based Upon Counsel Falsely Advising Mr. Nelson That He Was
Eligible For A Problem-Solving Court, While Knowing That He Was Not ........ 5
A. lntroduction ................................................................................................. 5
B. Standards Of Review ................................................................................. 5
C. There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether
Mr. Nelson's Trial Counsel Falsely Advised Him That He Would
Be Accepted Into A Problem Solving Court ................................................ 7
D. Mr. Nelson's Failure To Assert That His Guilty Plea Was Induced
By His Trial Counsel's False Promise On His Direct Appeal, Does
Not Preclude Him From Raising This Issue In Post-Conviction .................. 8
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 10

Cases

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
Aragon
Hill

(1986) ........................................ ?

v. State, 114 Idaho 758 (1988) .................................................................6

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

(1985) .................................................................. 6, 8

Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272 (1990) .................................................................. 8
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009) .............................................................. 7
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894 (Ct. App. 1993) ...................................................... 6
Ridgley v.

148 Idaho 671 (2010) ................................................................. 5

v. Yakovac, 1

Idaho 437 (2008) ............................. .....

.. .............. 5, 6, 7

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................. .
Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 185 P.3d 92·1 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................... 6
Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44 (2009) .................................................................... 7

Additional Authorities

Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999) ............................................................ 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Weston Nelson appeals from the district court's Judgment of Dismissal granting
the State's motion for summary dismissal.

Mr. Nelson

that the district court

erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his guilty plea was induced by his trial
counsel's false promise that he would be accepted into a problem solving court.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Nelson pied guilty to burglary and was sentenced to a unified term of 10
with 6

. (R., pp.14-1

) He filed a timely Petition for

Conviction

Relief along with an Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition. (R., pp.1117.) Mr. Nelson generally claimed that his counsel was ineffective, that his plea was not
knowing or voluntary because it was induced by promises that were not kept, and that
his sentence was disproportionate to the crime he pied guilty to. (R., p.15.) In one of
his claims, Mr. Nelson asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as his
counsel, "Told me I would qualify for a problem-solving court, which she was a member
of the board of, knowing that I was a Utah resident with no local ties." (R., p.16.) In his
affidavit, Mr. Nelson expanded on this claim asserting,
Ms. Campbell advised me to plead guilty as charged with the intent of
entering a problem solving court.
(Drug court or Wood pilot).
Ms. Campbell was a member of the board that approves or denies
applicants and she told me that I met the qualifications. On her advise
(sic), I plead guilty and applied to the problem-solving courts and was
immediately denied because I am resident of Utah and "have no local ties
and support to do the programs." This is information Ms. Campbell had
prior to giving me the faulty advice.

1

, p.11.)

The district court granted Mr. Nelson's request for

appointment of

(R., pp.18-21, 31.)
The State filed an Answer, a Motion for Summary Disposition, and a Brief in
Support of Summary Disposition arguing, generally, that the district court should
summarily dismiss Mr. Nelson's petition. (R., pp.33-36, 42-54.) Along with its other
arguments, the State asserted that "[i]n order for a claim to be raised in a postconviction proceeding, it must be raise on direct appeal or, a Petitioner must
demonstrate why the claim was not raised on direct appeal." (R., p.50.) Based upon
this analysis, the State asserted that the only

that could be raised in this

raised and denied on appeal. (R., p.50.)
The court held a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal, during
which counsel for Mr. Nelson appeared to undermine all of Mr. Nelson's claims with the
exception of one. 1 (Tr., p.3, L.14 - p.7, L.6.) Regarding Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial
counsel falsely told him he would be eligible for a problem-solving court despite knowing
that he was a resident of Utah, trial counsel stated the following:
In 1(B), he indicates "She advised me to plead guilty with the intent
of entering a problem-solving court." He did apply for the problem-solving
courts, and he was turned down from Drug Court. He was turned down
from Wood Pilot Court. And he was also turned down for Mental Health
Court. So I don't see that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
supportedin(B)elthe~

Mr. Nelson had asserted that the State breached the terms of the plea agreement by
recommending the maximum sentence arguing that the plea agreement required the
State not to exceed the recommendation of the PSI writer, which was merely a
recommendation of incarceration. (R., p.11.) Counsel for Mr. Nelson requested an
evidentiary hearing on that issue. (Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.7, L.6.) Mr. Nelson does not assert
the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
1

2

Ls.9-16.) The district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal,
addressing Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial

induced him to

plead guilty under the false promise that he would be admitted to a problem-solving
court knowing that he was a resident of Utah. However, the district court stated,
I will also comment that there had been an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Idaho in this particular matter. And many issues, as you pointed
out in your brief, [Mr. Prosecutor], were raised, but none of them were
raised that were raised in the petition and could have been raised in this
particular matter. And, therefore, on that basis, I'm going to deny the
petition for post-conviction relief.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.16-24.) Mr. Nelson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.2-5, 57-60, 65-

3

ISSUE
Did the
court err in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of
Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, and his plea was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered into, based upon counsel falsely advising
Mr. Nelson that he was eligible for a problem-solving court, while knowing that he was
not?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal Of
Mr. Nelson's Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective, And His Plea Was Not
Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered Into, Based Upon Counsel Falsely
Advising Mr. Nelson That He Was Eligible For A Problem-Solving Court, While Knowing
That He Was Not
A.

Introduction
Mr. Nelson averred in his affidavit in support of his post-conviction petition that

his trial counsel told him that she was on the board that determined whether individuals
are eligible for a problem-solving court and that he would be eligible, knowing that
Mr. Nelson was not eligible because he was a resident of Utah. The State did not bring
to controvert this factual assertion. Therefore, there exists a genuine

forth

issue of material fact as to this issue and the district court erred in summarily dismissing
this issue.

B.

Standards Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature and, like a

plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of
the claim."

Id. at 443-444.

The application must present or be accompanied by

admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the postconviction petition may be subject to dismissal.

Id.

In addition, the post-conviction

petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010).

5

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly
post-conviction proceedings.

Thomas v.

1

Idaho 765, 769, 1

brought through
P.3d

1,

(Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must first show that trial

counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
760 ( 1988 ).

687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,

Where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is

shown if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at
760. Where a petitioner claims that his guilty plea was induced by the erroneous advice
of counsel,

petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel's erroneous advice, the

petitioner would not have entered into the plea agreement. Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

59-60 (1985).
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.

"A material fact has 'some logical connection with the

consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Id. On
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993).

6

The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there
a genuine issue of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry

of determining whether there is the need for a trial

whether, in other words, there are

any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.

The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be

regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal.

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho

247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor

the non-moving party,

and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of
the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).

C.

There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Nelson's Trial
Counsel Falsely Advised Him That He Would Be Accepted Into A Problem
Solving Court
Mr. Nelson swore in his affidavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief

that his trial counsel told him that she was on the board that decides who is eligible for a
problem-solving court, and that she told him that he was eligible despite knowing that he
was a resident of Utah and, thus, was not eligible to participate in a problem-solving
court. (R., p.11.) Mr. Nelson further swore that he pied guilty based upon this false
advice, and he applied for problem-solving courts only to find that he was not eligible
because of his residency, of which trial counsel was aware prior to his entering his plea.
(R., p.11.) As such, he has provided evidence which, if proven by a preponderance of
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the evidence, entitles him to post-conviction

Hill

V.

474 U

.

59-60 (1985).
The State presented no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Nelson's counsel's failure
to recognize the validity of this claim does not relieve the district court of its duty to
determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact which, if found in
Mr. Nelson's favor, would entitle him to relief. Therefore, this Court should find that the
district court erroneously granted the State's motion for summary dismissal of this issue,
and should remand the case to the district court with instructions that an evidentiary
hearing be held.

D.

Mr. Nelson's Failure To Assert That His Guilty Plea Was Induced By His Trial
Counsel's False Promise On His Direct Appeal, Does Not Preclude Him From
Raising This Issue In Post-Conviction
In its Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal, the State made the claim that "In

order for a claim to be raised in a post-conviction proceeding, it must be raise on direct
appeal or, a Petitioner must demonstrate why the claim was not raised on direct
appeal." (R., p.50.) The district court appears to have agreed with this proposition and
stated that it was denying Mr. Nelson's post-conviction petition on this basis. (Tr., p.9,
Ls.16-24.) Both the State and the district court are wrong.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised either in a direct appeal
or in a post-conviction, but not both. Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272 (1990). The fact
that Mr. Nelson did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his direct
appeal does not preclude him from raising these claims in his petition for post-conviction
relief. In fact, the opposite is true. Mr. Nelson's decision not to raise any ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in his direct appeal was a prerequisite to him being able to

8

raise these claims in his post-conviction. Thus, the district court's denial of Mr. Nelson's
claim on this basis is erroneous.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
summary dismissal of his claim that his plea was induced by a false promise made by
his trial counsel, and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2014.

JASJtJ
.
D~/uty State Appellate Public Defender
V
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